UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

JIMMY GREA	ΓHOUSE,)	CASE	NO.	1:05	CV	1769
I	Plaintiff,)	JUDGE	I JOI	HN M.	MAN	IOS
v.)	MEMOR	ו מוא ב	JM OF	ОРТ	NTON
DOLLAR GEN	ERAL,)	1111101	<u>univo</u> (<u> </u>	<u> </u>	.1111011
I	efendant.)					

On July 12, 2005, plaintiff pro se Jimmy Greathouse filed this in forma pauperis action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Dollar General. The complaint alleges plaintiff and a manager at one of defendant's stores got into a dispute, and that the manager called the police. Plaintiff waited in the store until the police arrived, and statements concerning the incident were taken. He asserts these events violated his constitutional rights. For the reasons stated below, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

Although <u>pro se</u> pleadings are liberally construed, <u>Boag v. MacDougall</u>, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam); <u>Haines v. Kerner</u>, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district court is required

to dismiss an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996).

Principles requiring generous construction of pro se pleadings are not without limits. <u>Beaudett v. City of Hampton</u>, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985). A complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements of some viable legal theory to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements. See Schied v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988). District courts are not required to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them or to construct full blown claims from sentence fragments. <u>Beaudette</u>, 775 F.2d at 1278. To do so would "require ...[the courts] to explore exhaustively all potential claims of pro se plaintiff, ... [and] а would...transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a

A claim may be dismissed <u>sua sponte</u>, without prior notice to the plaintiff and without service of process on the defendant, if the court explicitly states that it is invoking section 1915(e) [formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)] and is dismissing the claim for one of the reasons set forth in the statute. <u>McGore v. Wrigglesworth</u>, 114 F.3d 601, 608-09 (6th Cir. 1997); <u>Spruytte v. Walters</u>, 753 F.2d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 1985), <u>cert. denied</u>, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986); <u>Harris v. Johnson</u>, 784 F.2d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1986); <u>Brooks v. Seiter</u>, 779 F.2d 1177, 1179 (6th Cir. 1985).

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party." <u>Id.</u>

In <u>Parratt v. Taylor</u>, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), the Supreme Court stated that "the initial inquiry [in a section 1983 action] must focus on whether the two essential elements ... are present: (1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States."

Greathouse does not meet the threshold requirement in Parratt, as there is no indication that defendant acted under color of state law. Therefore, Dollar General is not amenable to suit under section 1983 unless it engaged in a conspiracy with public officials. Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984). There are no allegations reasonably suggesting such a conspiracy.

Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted and this action is dismissed under section 1915(e). Further, the court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.